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ARTICLES 
SUPPLY SIDE OR DISCRIMINATION?  
ASSESSING THE ROLE OF UNCONSCIOUS BIAS 
Amy L. Wax* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An increasingly prominent theme in legal scholarship is that unconscious bias is 
an important contributor to social disparities by race and gender. The intensive focus on 
inadvertent motives is grounded in laboratory observations that purport to demonstrate 
that people’s split-second reactions are influenced by group identity. Such responses, it 
is argued, routinely fuel discriminatory conduct against women and minorities. It 
follows that, where disparities exist, they can usually be traced back to the operation of 
biased psychological processes of which people are largely unaware. 
This Article examines these arguments by considering, and critiquing, the claimed 
link between unconscious bias and social disadvantage. The discussion begins, in Part 
II, with the recent case of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,1 in which the plaintiffs 
argued that Wal-Mart’s treatment of its female employees was uniformly, even if 
inadvertently, contaminated by gender stereotypes. In examining this contention, Part II 
elaborates on the distinction between risk and discrimination—between the potential 
for gender or other forbidden factors to influence decisions versus whether those 
factors are actually taken into account. Part III reviews, and finds wanting, the 
scientific evidence that claims to attribute real-world discriminatory treatment, and the 
resulting adverse outcomes, to unconsciously biased motives. Part IV.A discusses the 
general difficulties of demonstrating discrimination, which requires distinguishing 
between unlawful motives (conscious or unconscious) and other factors as a cause of 
unfavorable treatment. Part IV.B discusses the pervasive legal assumption that outcome 
disparities reflect discriminatory treatment and the documented intergroup differences 
that undermine that approach. Part V looks at measures proposed to address inadvertent 
bias, and notes the lack of evidence that any of them will have the intended effect of 
diminishing unlawful discrimination. Parts VI and VII argue that, given the existence 
of significant “supply side” factors that explain persistent intergroup differences, it is 
unlikely that unconscious discrimination is an important source of social disadvantage, 
especially for race. The discussion then concludes with the suggestion that the roots of 
 
* Robert Mundheim Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. This Article is based on a 
presentation given at Temple Law Review’s November 2011 Symposium: “The Evolution of Civil Rights 
Litigation: Using Social Science and Statistics to Prove Employment Discrimination and Predatory Lending.” 
1. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
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inequality are best addressed directly through policies aimed at their alleviation rather 
than through anti-discrimination law. 
II. THE WAL-MART CLASS ACTION: POSSIBLE VERSUS ACTUAL STEREOTYPING 
In Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,2 women employed at Wal-Mart stores 
nationwide sued the giant retailer, claiming that female workers as a class received less 
favorable treatment than males.3 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that women “are 
paid less than men in comparable positions,” despite their better performance and 
greater seniority, and that women “receive fewer—and wait longer for—promotions to 
. . . management positions than men.”4  
Central to the plaintiffs’ case was the allegation of stereotyping.5 According to the 
plaintiffs’ theory, Wal-Mart supervisors harbored a set of ideas and expectations about 
the roles of women (and men).6 These ideas and expectations swayed personnel 
decisions in ways that systematically disadvantaged female workers. A linchpin of this 
alleged scenario is the exercise of managerial discretion. The plaintiffs contended that 
managers’ unguided authority to promote and reward employees at the store level 
allowed stereotypes to influence how workers were treated.7 Senior management did 
nothing to correct these patterns, and indeed sanctioned the discretionary methods that 
gave stereotypes free rein.8 
Although the allegations in Wal-Mart did not rest solely on claims of unconscious 
bias,9 they were consistent with the possibility that Wal-Mart’s unfavorable treatment 
of women was influenced by inadvertent motives. Indeed, the notion that unconscious 
stereotyping was operating at Wal-Mart fits with the type of arguments that have 
recently been made against large national corporations. Wal-Mart staunchly professed a 
commitment to equal opportunity in its hiring and promotional practices.10 The 
company denied any hint of an official policy to treat male and female employees 
differently, and no finding in the case contradicted the company’s commitment to 
evenhanded procedures. The plaintiffs nonetheless maintained that the company 
regularly made biased choices. Their theory of the case boiled down to the allegation 
that stereotypes of women—as, for example, less capable, reliable, or committed—
 
2. 603 F.3d 571 (2010), rev’d, 131 S.Ct. 2547 (2011). 
3. Wal-Mart, 603 F.3d at 577. 
4. Id. 
5. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 145 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (“Plaintiffs submit 
evidence that Wal–Mart cultivates and maintains a strong corporate culture which includes gender 
stereotyping.”). 
6. Id. at 165–66. 
7. Id. at 148–51. 
8. Id. at 145; see also Lesley Wexler, Wal-Mart Matters, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 95, 105–11 (2011) 
(providing detailed explanation of plaintiffs’ theory on discrimination). 
9. See Wal-Mart, 222 F.R.D. at 154–66 (discussing plaintiffs’ statistical evidence of gender disparities 
among Wal-Mart’s workforce and anecdotal evidence of discriminatory intent by some Wal-Mart managers). 
10. See Brief for Petitioner at 3, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 10-277), 
2011 WL 201045 (“Wal-Mart's company-wide policy . . . expressly bars discrimination based on sex, and 
Wal-Mart has consistently promulgated and enforced equal opportunity policies . . . prohibit[ing] unlawful 
discrimination.”). 
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were allowed to infect employment decisions.11 Although plaintiffs’ arguments did not 
expressly rest on the assertion that stereotypes operated inadvertently, their contentions 
were consistent with supervisors and managers being unaware that their decisions were 
distorted by improper stereotypes. In short, according to plaintiffs, the supervisors’ 
good faith did not rule out liability.12  
Critical to the plaintiffs’ case in Wal-Mart was the testimony of William Bielby, 
an expert who frequently participates in bias claims against large corporate 
employers.13 Central to Bielby’s testimony was the assertion that “[p]ersonnel policy 
and practice at Wal-Mart as implemented in the field has features known to be 
vulnerable to gender bias.”14 In support of this, Bielby recounted the record evidence 
that individual store managers exercised broad discretion in the promotion and pay of 
store employees. According to Bielby, “there are no written criteria for selecting hourly 
associates for promotion into management . . . beyond the minimum requirements.”15 
Therefore, managers “have discretion to devise their own criteria, with no monitoring 
or oversight over how those criteria are devised or applied.”16 In Bielby’s view, such 
unguided discretion posed a significant risk that gender stereotypes could influence 
personnel decisions and thereby operate to the disadvantage of female employees.17 In 
justifying his conclusion that Wal-Mart’s employment practices were vulnerable to 
bias, Bielby cited “[a] large body of research” demonstrating that “the tendency to 
invoke gender stereotypes in making judgments about people is spontaneous and 
automatic.”18 He noted that “[a]s a result, people are often unaware of how stereotypes 
affect their perceptions and behavior, and individuals whose personal beliefs are 
relatively free of prejudice or bias are susceptible to stereotypes in the same ways as 
people who hold a personal animosity towards a social group.”19  
The Bielby testimony has been the subject of considerable controversy. Some 
social scientists—including leading proponents of the “social framework” approach 
that Bielby purported to apply in his Wal-Mart statements—have claimed that Bielby’s 
allegations represent a misuse of the research upon which he relies.20 Although a full 
analysis of the controversy is not possible here, one key point is worth considering in 
greater detail. 
 
11. For a review of the arguments in Wal-Mart, see Wexler, supra note 8, at 105–11. 
12. See Amy L. Wax, The Discriminating Mind: Define It, Prove It, 40 CONN. L. REV. 979, 987 (2008) 
(noting allegations of discrimination against employers with professed commitment to equal opportunity). 
13. Grace E. Speights & Bernard R. Siskin, The Impact of Statistical Evidence in Class Action 
Litigation, SS032 ALI-ABA 859, 883 (2011) (“Dr. William Bielby has clearly been the most prominent 
proponent of the stereotyping theory and has testified regarding the theory in many cases.”).  
14. Declaration of William T. Bielby, Ph.D in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification at 5, 
Wal-Mart, 222 F.R.D. 137 (No. C-01-2252), 2003 WL 24571701. 
15. Id. at 22. 
16. Id.  
17. Id. at 19–20 (“In such settings, stereotypes can bias assessments of a woman’s qualifications, 
contributions, and advancement potential, because perceptions are shaped by stereotypical beliefs about 
women generally, not by the actual skills and accomplishments of the person as an individual.”). 
18. Id. at 17–18.  
19. Id. at 18.  
20. For a discussion of this controversy, see Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Weigh Sociology Issue in 
Wal-Mart Discrimination Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2011, at A17. 
  
880 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
 
The Wal-Mart litigation was based on the assertion that the procedures used at 
Wal-Mart were vulnerable to distortion by gender stereotyping. But what does that 
mean for individual female employees within the class? A close reading of Bielby’s 
testimony reveals that Wal-Mart’s practices create the potential for decisions to be 
tainted by illicit considerations of gender instead of resting solely on meritocratic 
factors such as “qualifications, contributions, and advancement potential.” But that is 
not the same as proving that stereotyping actually influenced any particular 
employment decision. That distinction turns out to be critical to the procedural issue of 
class certification that was recently considered by the Supreme Court,21 as well as to 
the underlying merits of the allegations of gender discrimination. Specifically, it is 
relevant to whether the plaintiff class was sufficiently similar—that is, whether its 
members had enough in common—to warrant class certification. And, as noted in the 
Court's decision, the distinction between potential and actual discrimination was 
pertinent to which individual class members would ultimately be entitled to monetary 
relief for the harms they suffered from unlawful discrimination.22 
During the oral argument before the Supreme Court on class certification, the 
attorney for Wal-Mart noted that Bielby maintained only that Wal-Mart’s policies 
created the potential for stereotyping. He stressed that Bielby did not purport to 
identify which particular decisions were biased, or to demonstrate how many decisions 
were impermissibly influenced or distorted by gender concerns. Indeed, Bielby 
admitted under questioning that he could not be sure that any personnel decisions at 
Wal-Mart had been swayed by stereotypes. As Wal-Mart’s counsel stated, “the 
sociologist here [Dr. Bielby], who is the glue that’s supposed to hold this class 
together, said he couldn’t tell if stereotyping was occurring one half of 1 percent or 95 
percent or at all.”23 The attorney for Wal-Mart went on to observe that “[t]he question 
here is whether . . . we can assume that every decisionmaker acted in the same manner 
in a way that had . . . the same injury.”24 He argued that the answer to this question was 
clearly no, adding that “the plaintiffs need[] to come forward with something that 
show[s] that there was this miraculous recurrence at every decision across every store 
of stereotyping, and the evidence simply doesn’t show that.”25 
Justice Ginsberg appeared to echo these concerns when she suggested at oral 
argument that Bielby’s concessions would likely have some bearing on one aspect of 
the case—the relief that individual female employees would receive if the class action 
went forward and Wal-Mart was ultimately found liable for violating Title VII.26 Along 
these lines, Ginsberg noted a “very serious problem in this case” of “how [to] work out 
the back pay” due each member of the class.27 Determining back pay requires 
identifying individuals who actually suffered a loss from unlawful discrimination. The 
 
21. See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
22. Id. at 2557–59. 
23. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 10-
277).  
24. Id. at 13–14. 
25. Id. at 9. 
26. Id. at 33–34. 
27. Id. at 33. 
  
2011] ASSESSING THE ROLE OF UNCONSCIOUS BIAS 881 
 
need to determine who was victimized, and to measure how much each victim was 
harmed, highlights the gap between the risk of discrimination (which is alleged to be 
created by a discretionary evaluation system), and whether, and to what extent, 
discrimination actually occurred. Ginsberg notes that, because the plaintiff class is very 
large, “there’s no way [the judge] could possibly try each of these individual[] 
[cases].”28 Yet the proper determination of the remedy requires just such an 
individualized inquiry. 
That a hearing on each employee is necessary, at least at the remedial phase, 
suggests that it is impossible to assume on the facts as stated (at least at the preliminary 
stage of class certification) that every member of the plaintiff class was the victim of 
unlawful discrimination. Some women at Wal-Mart may not have been harmed by 
stereotyping or bias. Perhaps many were not. Indeed, some of the women received 
promotions and pay raises, and many stores were headed by female managers. 
Furthermore, it cannot be assumed that all of the women who were denied benefits or 
promotions were the targets of unlawful treatment. Not everyone who does poorly in 
the workplace is the victim of discrimination. Some negative outcomes—including 
denials of promotions or raises, discipline, or termination—might be deserved. Even if 
undeserved, these actions might have nothing to do with gender stereotyping or sex. 
All these concerns are in fact reflected in the Supreme Court’s decision in the 
Wal-Mart case, which was issued at the end of the 2010-2011 term.29 The majority 
opinion resolved the preliminary procedural question of whether the class action was 
properly certified in the case.30 The Court’s resolution of that issue in Wal-Mart’s favor 
rested in large part on the diversity of circumstances for the individuals in the class and 
the difficulty of proving actual discrimination against the group. The majority opinion 
focused on the distinction between the danger of discriminatory stereotyping allegedly 
presented by managerial discretion, and whether or not the exercise of that discretion 
actually resulted in gender-based discrimination against particular female employees. 
As the Court stated, “the recognition that this type of Title VII claim ‘can’ exist does 
not lead to the conclusion that every employee in a company using a system of 
discretion has such a claim in common.”31 Specifically, even if the plaintiffs could 
show a general vulnerability, or “pattern and practice” of decisionmaking that posed a 
heightened risk of discrimination, only class members who actually suffered 
discrimination would be entitled to back pay.32 That entitlement—which requires a 
showing of unlawful discrimination towards a particular person—would have to be 
determined for each employee and would require “additional proceedings.”33 
The case against Wal-Mart was grounded in an allegation of disparate treatment—
the claim that employment decisions were influenced by the forbidden factor of the 
employee’s gender. The assertion that gender somehow “caused” some unknown 
number of unfavorable outcomes for Wal-Mart’s female employees lay at the heart of 
 
28. Id. at 34. 
29. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
30. Id. at 2547. 
31. Id. at 2554.  
32. Id. at 2560. 
33. Id. at 2561.  
  
882 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
 
the plaintiffs’ claims in the case. But the Supreme Court’s decision makes clear that the 
distinction between the possibility of discrimination and actual discrimination cannot 
be ignored. Plaintiffs’ theory of the case turned on the identification of a risk—
specifically, the risk that stereotypical assumptions might influence how managers treat 
women. That risk might be great or small in magnitude; it might apply to a few women, 
or most, or all. But creating a potential risk is not the same as engaging in unlawful 
discrimination towards one or more individuals. A risk is only a possibility, and 
possibilities might not be realized in every case. 
Critics will contend that this analysis is churlish and overly simple, because it 
slights the centrality of the risk of biased employment decisions and the vital 
importance of reducing or eliminating that risk. The Wal-Mart allegation is that certain 
practices and workplace protocols enhance the possibility that female workers will be 
stereotyped and that their treatment will be tainted by unlawful concerns. As an 
institutional matter, this is not a trivial accusation, and such an effect might actually 
exist. In fact, there are special types of anti-discrimination lawsuits that seek to address 
such possibilities. So-called “pattern or practice” litigation, although not currently 
commonplace, seems designed to do this.34 Although the doctrine is complicated, 
pattern or practice litigation starts with the fact of group disparities, identifies a practice 
that might be causing them, and then shifts the burden to employers to offer a non-
discriminatory explanation for the disparate pattern of outcomes observed.35 If no 
plausible explanation is forthcoming, courts can “reasonably conclude that the 
statistically significant disparity is the product of intentional discrimination.”36 
Pattern or practice lawsuits infrequently succeed, in part because “plain[] and 
open[]” discrimination has faded from the landscape,37 and also because defendants 
have become more sophisticated about asserting persuasive non-discriminatory reasons 
for unfavorable treatment and group disparities. Likewise, courts have become more 
skeptical of discrimination as the explanation for observed group outcome differences, 
and are more aware of plausible alternatives.38 The situation poses even more 
challenges for plaintiffs when the ultimate goal of litigation is not just to identify and 
eliminate a tainted or risky practice, but to vindicate individual claims of 
discrimination. As already discussed, unless a victim has been personally harmed by a 
forbidden practice, he or she is not entitled to relief. Thus, when employees seek 
individual redress and compensation, rather than just prospective company-wide 
reform, the courts cannot avoid the question of individual causation. In awarding a 
monetary remedy—the type that, understandably, many plaintiffs fervently desire—this 
problem looms large. 
 
34. For a recent discussion of the Supreme Court’s pattern or practice jurisprudence, see Michael Selmi, 
Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. (forthcoming 2011), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1809944. 
35. See id. (manuscript at 3–6) (describing characteristics of pattern or practice claims as distinguished 
from disparate impact claims). 
36. Id. (manuscript at 6). 
37. Id. (manuscript at 7). 
38. Id. (noting that it has become “less clear, at least to the courts, that discrimination always provided 
the best explanation for the observed disparities”). For more on alternative explanations, see infra Part III. 
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III. EXPLANATIONS FOR DISPARATE OUTCOMES: DOES IMPLICIT BIAS PREDICT 
DISCRIMINATION? 
The distinction between risk and discrimination—between the potential for 
forbidden factors to contribute to an unfavorable decision, as opposed to whether those 
factors actually do so—is particularly critical to the debate surrounding the role of 
unconscious bias, and what (if anything) should be done about it. Specifically, the issue 
is relevant to whether unconsciously biased thinking actually produces discriminatory 
harms. Resolving this question highlights the importance of considering and ruling out 
alternative explanations for individual and group-level disparities in outcomes on the 
job and in other areas of social life. It also requires a critical look at the research that 
purports to detect unconscious bias, and at the studies that claim to link this bias to 
discriminatory treatment in the real world. 
In the few years since I last addressed these topics,39 many articles have appeared 
touting the significance of unconscious biases and inadvertent stereotyping for 
decisionmaking in a range of contexts. While some researchers have cast a rigorous and 
critical eye on the data and have expressed grave doubt about the value of correlations 
and predictions,40 others have made sweeping claims about the science’s far-reaching 
significance.41 Unfortunately, too much of this work still fails adequately to grapple 
with the issues of proof and causation that are central to any proper analysis of the role 
of unconscious processes in the law of discrimination. 
An important research review by Hart Blanton and colleagues, which summarizes 
and analyzes the social science evidence on unconscious bias and its predictive value, 
highlights the shortcomings (and misuse) of much of the data in this area.42 The focus 
of this review is on the so-called implicit association test (IAT), a much-studied 
technique that purports to gauge prejudice towards social groups based on split-second 
reaction times measured in the laboratory. As developed by Mahzarin Banaji and her 
colleagues at Harvard, the IAT measures the speed with which subjects associate 
negative versus positive words or concepts with images of people from different 
backgrounds.43 The association is thought to reveal unconscious processes similar to 
stereotyping. In the context of race, for instance, the contention is that people who 
more quickly link negative ideas to black faces and positive ideas to white faces show 
that they harbor unconscious negative stereotypes or biases against blacks. Researchers 
have maintained that people with such negative associations will be more likely to 
engage in racial discrimination.44 
 
39. See generally Wax, supra note 12; Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129 
(1999). 
40. E.g., Hart Blanton et al., Strong Claims and Weak Evidence: Reassessing the Predictive Validity of 
the IAT, 94 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 567 (2009). 
41. E.g., John T. Jost et al., The Existence of Implicit Bias Is Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Refutation 
of Ideological and Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of Ten Studies That No Manager 
Should Ignore, 29 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 39 (2009). 
42. See generally Blanton et al., supra note 40. 
43. See generally Brian A. Nosek et al., The Implicit Association Test at Age 7: A Methodological and 
Conceptual Review, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: THE AUTOMATICITY OF HIGHER 
MENTAL PROCESSES 265 (John A. Bargh ed. 2007). 
44. For a more in depth discussion, see Wax, supra note 12, at 1018–21. 
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The Blanton review concludes that the research permits neither the prediction nor 
the identification of discriminatory conduct at the individual level.45 The lack of 
credible evidence on the predictive value of measures of unconscious bias is especially 
acute in the context of race. Because race is an important focus of discrimination law 
and scholarship, claims regarding the operational role and real-world significance of 
unconscious racial bias loom large. Employment discrimination is another area of 
frequent litigation and obsessive concern by legal scholars, with much of the discussion 
of unconscious bias centering on allegations of unfair treatment in the workplace. 
Based on the contention that unconscious stereotyping is pervasive in the employment 
arena, far-reaching proposals for legal and structural reform are now a staple of legal 
scholarship.46 These recommendations, and the evidence claimed to support them, do 
not withstand scrutiny. Put simply, existing research on unconscious bias does not 
permit an inference of unlawful racial discrimination in any particular case. In 
particular, the IAT is of no help, as of yet, in determining which, if any, adverse 
outcomes for minorities, either in the workplace or elsewhere, are due to racial 
discrimination as opposed to other forces or factors.47 Finally, the paucity of credible 
evidence extends to measures that have been proposed to alleviate the effects of 
unconscious bias. As the discussion below reveals, there is no reason to believe that the 
sweeping reforms recommended by scholars will reduce inadvertent discrimination in 
the workplace. 
The failure to establish a credible connection between implicit-bias evidence and 
legally actionable discrimination remains a feature of both the social science literature 
and legal scholarship. Despite extravagant claims to the contrary, recent articles on this 
topic reveal the paucity of reliable data linking laboratory measures of unconscious bias 
to real-world instances of discriminatory treatment. Some of the key articles that 
exemplify this failure are worth examining in more detail. 
 A recent lengthy review by psychologist John T. Jost, of New York University, 
and his colleagues is typical in raising expectations that are ultimately unfulfilled.48 
The Jost article, which appeared in a specialty journal of organizational psychology, 
reviews reports of IAT results for a range of subjects under a variety of conditions. 
According to the authors, the research in this area reveals people’s pervasive, albeit 
variable, tendency to associate negative words and characteristics with racial 
minorities.49 That is, there is ample evidence of “positive” IAT results. The authors 
consider the question of whether these IAT findings “reliably predict[] class-wide 
discrimination”50—that is, whether these measures predict trait-based decisions in the 
real world.  
The decisions of greatest interest—at least to lawyers—are those that potentially 
give rise to legal action. Consider once again the subject of racial discrimination in 
 
45. Blanton et al., supra note 40, at 578. 
46. See infra Part VI for a discussion of reforms that have been proposed. 
47. See infra notes 48–85 and accompanying text for a critique of research purportedly demonstrating 
the predictive value of the IAT. 
48. Jost et al., supra note 41. 
49. Id. at 42–46. 
50. Id. at 46. 
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employment. The relevant evidence in Jost’s review includes only two studies that 
purport to show a link between implicit bias as measured by the IAT and workplace 
discrimination.51 It is striking that, in a twenty-two page, single-spaced review, these 
two studies represent the sum total of research directly pertinent to the sweeping claim 
that the IAT “predicts socially and organizationally significant behavior, including [in] 
employment.”52 One of the cited studies, describing research conducted in Sweden, 
claims to establish a correlation between managers’ IAT scores and their willingness to 
interview Swedish or Arab job candidates with otherwise similar job resumes.53 The 
other cited study is a brief paper in the American Economic Review (AER) that, 
according to Jost and colleagues, purports to find that “scores on an implicit 
stereotyping task involving race and intelligence were correlated with students’ 
likelihood of selecting resumes with African American names, especially among 
participants who felt rushed while completing a resume-selection task.”54 However, the 
referenced paper falls far short of delivering on the promised description.  
 The purpose of the cited paper, which was designed as a preliminary study and 
brief introduction to the field, is to familiarize economists with the idea that 
discrimination “may be unintentional and outside the discriminator’s awareness.”55 The 
AER paper includes a cursory, conclusory review of the basics of IAT research, which 
briefly touches on the question of whether and how strongly the data establish a link 
between tests of unconscious bias (specifically, the IAT) and real-world behavior. 
Along these lines, the AER paper contains one short (i.e., two paragraph) description of 
a small pilot project, which was designed to follow up on a previous experimental 
observation that hypothetical job candidates with black-sounding names were hired less 
often than candidates with similar resumes and white-sounding names.56 Based on a 
pilot screening of 50 resumes by 115 participating subjects, the AER report states that 
participants who implicitly associated blacks with lower intelligence (based on a rapid 
link between the words “black” and “dumb”) picked relatively fewer black-sounding 
candidates, especially under time-pressured conditions.57 However, no actual numbers 
were presented and no data analysis was included. The AER authors stressed the limited 
nature and shortcomings of their findings.58 They stated, without further explanation, 
that “we did not find discrimination, on average, in the lab”; that the lab exercise 
lacked “external validity”; and that the tests faced “implementation problems.”59 
These findings amount to very thin gruel on which to base claims of pervasive 
unconscious bias in the employment context. The only other studies cited in the Jost 
review focus on behaviors that are far removed from the actual employment context, 
 
51. Id. at 49 (citing Marianne Bertrand et al., Implicit Discrimination, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 94 (2005); 
Dan-Olof Rooth Implicit Discrimination in Hiring: Real World Evidence (Inst. for the Study of Labor (IZA), 
Discussion Paper No. 2764, Apr. 2007)). 
52. Id. at 39 (abstract). 
53. Id. at 49 (citing Rooth, supra note 51).  
54. Id. (citing Bertrand et al., supra note 51). 
55. Bertrand et al., supra note 51, at 94. 
56. Id. at 96–97. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 97. 
59. Id. 
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and most do not even deal with race. For example, the reports connect measured 
implicit reaction times to the tendency to engage in binge drinking,60 to choose one of 
two candidates for the President of Italy,61 to express sexual attraction towards 
children,62 and to suffer from suicidal ideation.63 The point of these studies is to 
contrast express attitudes with implicit associations as predictors of actual behavior. 
The goal is to try to demonstrate that implicit attitudes are a better guide to future 
behavior than what subjects actually say about their preferences or what they 
themselves predict they will do. But that is a far cry from demonstrating that the IAT 
can predict who will discriminate against workers based on race. 
 The only other research paper Jost and colleagues rely on to demonstrate the role 
of implicit racial bias in predicting real-world decisions is one claiming to show that 
medical trainees with higher (more “anti-black”) IAT scores are more likely to 
recommend thrombolytic-type therapy for white rather than black patients described in 
hypothetical profiles that suggest a diagnosis of coronary-artery disease.64 Jost and 
colleagues describe this study as demonstrating “that implicit racial bias predicts the 
withholding of valuable medical treatment from some patients.”65 This allegedly 
suggests “that one’s degree of implicit bias can have life-or-death consequences for 
others.”66 However, the dire assertion that implicit racial bias leads to life-threatening 
deprivation of treatment represents a significant overreading of the study. The reported 
study suffers from a critical flaw: there is no evidence presented that the particular 
therapies prescribed on the basis of the hypothetical profiles would lead to worse 
outcomes for the black patients.67 Without that direct evidence of harm, there is no 
reason to believe that “more is better.” Accordingly, there is no basis for inferring the 
general proposition that blacks will suffer from the physician behaviors evinced by the 
study or that doctors who prescribe thrombolytic therapy less frequently to blacks are 
biased “against” that group. In addition, there is no a priori reason to assume that, in 
the actual world of medical practice, blacks and whites with similar symptoms should 
necessarily receive the same treatment. The success and appropriateness of a particular 
therapy may not just be a function of the patient’s specific symptoms and medical 
diagnosis, but could also be influenced by genetic factors, general health status, and 
surrounding social circumstances that might bear on the effectiveness and response to 
 
60. Jost et al., supra note 41, at 52. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 53. 
63. Id. 
64. See Alexander R. Green et al., Implicit Bias Among Physicians and Its Prediction of Thrombolysis 
Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1231 (2007), discussed in Jost et al., supra 
note 41, at 51–52. 
65. Jost et al., supra note 41, at 52. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 51–52. The Jost review also present studies that purport to show the existence of implicit biases 
directly (without any correlation with IAT scores). For example, some research claims that police recruits, in 
simulated confrontations, are more likely to shoot black than white subjects. Id at 50–51. However, the data 
also indicate that these effects are small and short-lived and wash out with training. Id. at 51. 
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different therapies.68 To the extent that these might systematically differ by race, it is at 
least arguable that doctors might end up making different decisions, at least on average, 
for patients from different groups, and that those patterns might benefit patients overall 
and thereby be medically justified. In sum, although doctors might sometimes end up 
treating races differently, or even taking race into account in some medical contexts, it 
is far from clear that this will prove detrimental. To be sure, the role of race in medical 
treatment is controversial.69 But that controversy does not establish proof of harm. 
In sum, despite the virtually non-existent evidence to support their sweeping 
conclusions, Jost and co-authors assert with vigor and confidence that implicit bias 
pervades the business world, and that minorities are routinely harmed by its 
operation.70 As a measure of their desperation and the paucity of hard facts, the authors 
ultimately abandon any attempt to demonstrate the predictive power of the IAT with 
actual data, and simply shift the burden of proof. Citing a number of audit studies 
purporting to show that “racial discrimination continues to exist in the marketplace,” 
but that have nothing to do with measures of implicit bias, the authors simply state that 
“no research exists to sustain [the] buoyant assumption that managers would be 
immune to the effects of implicit bias.”71 This bald assertion, which runs contrary to the 
entire structure of anti-discrimination law and the burden of proof for civil liability, 
suggests that employers are guilty until proven innocent and that plaintiffs in 
discrimination lawsuits are always right. In effect, the statement represents an attempt 
to short-circuit the problem of prediction entirely. In inviting legal plaintiffs to dispense 
with the arduous work of establishing the relationship between laboratory research on 
implicit bias and actual unlawful discrimination, the statement amounts to nothing 
more than special pleading, wishful thinking, and hand waving. Yet this move is not 
exceptional. Unsupported assumptions are all too common, not just in the research 
literature but also in the legal scholarship that draws upon it.  
A lengthy law review article,72 published in 2006 and written by a leading IAT 
researcher, Mahzarin Banaji, and a UCLA law professor, Jerry Kang, is typical of the 
genre. This piece boldly asserts in its introduction that “the magnitude of implicit bias 
towards members of outgroups or disadvantaged groups is large.” 73 It also states that 
“implicit bias influences evaluations of and behavior towards those who are the subject 
of the bias.”74 Based on these statements, the authors then proceed to justify affirmative 
 
68. See, e.g., Esteban González Burchard et al., The Importance of Race and Ethnic Background in 
Biomedical Research and Clinical Practice, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1170, 1174–75 (2003) (discussing need to 
further understand “variations among racial and ethnic groups in the prevalence and severity of diseases and in 
responses to treatment” (emphasis added)). 
69. See, e.g., id. at 1171 (suggesting that “[e]xcessive focus on racial or ethnic differences” may create 
“risk of undervaluing the great diversity that exists among persons within groups”). 
70. Jost et al., supra note 41, at 46–51 (describing “ten studies no manager should ignore”). 
71. Id. at 49. 
72. Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative 
Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2006). 
73. Id. at 1064. 
74. Id. For a more recent article, also co-authored by Jerry Kang, that makes similar points, see Jerry 
Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465 
(2010). 
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action in a host of domains not as a historical corrective but as a “response[] to 
discrimination in the here and now.”75 Because unconscious bias is pervasive and 
significant, say Kang and Banaji, racial preferences should be adopted until such time 
as “measures of implicit bias for a region or nation are at zero or some rough 
behavioral equivalent.”76 In other words, the results of IAT research justify the 
indefinite continuation of racial affirmative action across the board. 
On the critical question of whether IAT scores actually correlate with real-world 
behaviors, Kang and Banaji rely primarily on the results of an unpublished meta-review 
(which was subsequently published in 2009), that analyzed 224 claimed IAT-
behavioral correlations reported in 21 published and 31 unpublished papers.77 Kang 
and Banaji describe this meta-analysis as showing that “implicit biases correlate[] with 
real-world behaviors like being friendly toward a target, allocating resources to 
minority organizations, and evaluating job candidates.”78 However, the authors 
themselves concede that most of the behaviors that were actually measured—such as 
eye contact and “stiff body language”—are only “intermediary steps to some final 
decision” and not the final decision itself.79 Indeed, the only cited study that purported 
to establish a direct connection between measures of implicit racial bias and a bottom-
line choice regarding job candidates of different races showed unimpressive results: the 
study was small, and a significant IAT-outcome correlation was measured only when 
“the president of the firm signaled his preference [to the study subjects] for a White 
hire.”80 In other words, the study subjects could only be observed to engage in 
measurable discrimination when explicitly directed to do so by their boss! It is worth 
noting that this situation differs markedly from the typical scenario, as exemplified in 
Wal-Mart, where a business vigorously embraces equal opportunity and non-
discrimination, but workers contend that subconscious bias nonetheless undermines the 
operation of those principles.81 
Finally, Kang and Banaji make much of the paper by Green et al.—cited by Jost 
and colleagues and described above—that purports to link medical interns’ IAT scores 
to their treatment decisions for black and white patients with possible coronary artery 
disease.82 In describing the study, Kang and Banaji report that the physicians 
prescribed appropriate state-of-the-art thrombolytic therapy with similar frequency to 
 
75. Kang & Banaji, supra note 72, at 1065. 
76. Id. at 1066. 
77. See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-
Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 17 (2009), cited in Kang & Banaji, supra 
note 72, at 1073. 
78. Kang & Banaji, supra note 72, at 1073. 
79. Id.; see also Kang & Lane, supra note 74, at 488 (noting that research attempting to correlate implicit 
biases with behavior is focused on a range of responses including intermediate variables such as “non-verbal 
behavior, social judgments, physiological responses”). 
80. Kang & Banaji, supra note 72, at 1073–74. 
81. Id. at 1074 (citing Jonathan C. Ziegert & Paul J. Hanges, Employment Discrimination: The Role of 
Implicit Attitudes, Motivation, and a Climate for Racial Bias, 90 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 553, 556 (2005)). The 
Zeigert study has been vigorously criticized as unsound by Blanton and colleagues based on their review of the 
data underlying the report. Blanton et al., supra note 40, at 578–80. 
82. See Kang & Banaji, supra note 72, at 1074–75 (citing Green et al., supra note 64). 
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both black and white hypothetical patients, but that the black patients were more likely 
to receive a diagnosis of CAD.83 In their view, this “creat[es] a greater discrepancy 
between diagnosis and treatment for black than white patients.”84 The authors construe 
the study as revealing the doctors’ adoption of a “stereotype that blacks were stubborn 
and noncompliant and therefore likely to refuse treatment,” but they cite no direct 
evidence for this interpretation.85 Once again, the authors say nothing about the health 
outcomes that might result from the treatment decisions at issue, which were based on 
short hypothetical vignettes rather than flesh and blood patients. The authors do not 
discuss whether blacks in the real world would suffer adverse effects relative to whites 
from somewhat lower rates of treatment with a particular type of therapy, or whether 
that question might be dependent on broader background or contextual details that were 
not revealed in the study. In any event, whether “withholding” certain treatments, or 
administering others, is helpful or hurtful to individuals or groups is not amenable to 
theoretical speculation from a small number of short hypothetical descriptions. Rather, 
the issue is an empirical one, yielding only to extensive, painstaking, and disinterested 
data collection and analysis. 
IV. DISPARATE OUTCOMES: DISCRIMINATION, OR SOME OTHER EXPLANATION? 
A. Leaping to Conclusions on Discrimination 
The articles discussed above share a crucial defect: they assume background facts 
that need to be demonstrated and thereby leap to a host of unsupported conclusions. 
The authors take for granted that real-world decisions are regularly and predictably 
distorted by forbidden and unconscious biases and that outcome differences are the 
product of unlawful discrimination. This obviates the need to demonstrate actual 
discrimination in particular cases. Causation is assumed, and alternative explanations 
disregarded or dismissed.86  
Paradoxically, one claim that appears in the literature is that the degree of bias 
revealed by the IAT is predictive of discrimination.87 That is, there is a quantitative 
correlation between implicit reactions and real-world behavior. This assertion is at odds 
with another oft-repeated refrain, which is that both bias and discrimination are 
constant and pervasive—a background feature of the social landscape. The problem is 
that IAT test scores show considerable variation. If the IAT is a predictor, this would 
imply that the degree of implicit bias—and the resulting discrimination—are highly 
variable as well, with some people discriminating very little or not at all. But that 
negates the vision of bias as infecting all social situations and contaminating all 
decisionmaking. At the very least, discrimination is a matter of degree. It follows that, 
 
83. Id. at 1074. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. See generally Wax, supra note 12 (discussing importance of causation in discrimination claims). 
87. See, e.g., Green et al., supra note 64, 1237–38 (claiming that IAT scores predict the tendency to 
underprescribe thrombolytic therapies to black patients); Jost et al., supra note 41, at 47–48 (listing studies that 
claim IAT scores correlate with probability of displaying certain biased behaviors). 
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in some circumstances, discrimination will be minimal or non-existent. The challenge, 
therefore, is to figure out when discrimination operates and when it does not. It cannot 
be assumed to occur at all times, or even most of the time, when disparities by race and 
gender exist. But figuring out when unlawful discrimination is the cause of disparate 
outcomes has been the task of anti-discrimination law from the beginning. 
Lurking behind the talk of unconscious bias is the need to explain adverse 
treatment. With respect to employment, which is the focus of the discussion here, 
allegations of unlawful discrimination arise when a person is the target of an 
unfavorable employment decision, such as the failure to be hired or promoted into a 
desired position, or the denial of sought-after compensation or benefits. Is the outcome 
due to unlawful discrimination, or does it have some other explanation? This is the 
critical question in the down-to-earth, real-world context in which allegations of 
discrimination arise. Some employees are feckless, lazy, or incompetent. Others are 
simply less proficient, capable, industrious, or productive than rival workers present on 
the job. Sometimes employment decisions are actually made “on the merits.” 
Sometimes managers’ decisions are uncontaminated by illegitimate motives. And, as an 
extensive body of “mixed motive” jurisprudence recognizes, even decisions that are 
partly influenced by bias, chance, or arbitrary considerations might still be justified by 
other factors that are rationally related to personnel management.88 
In the world of employment discrimination law, these possibilities are assumed to 
exist, and they matter. The doctrines surrounding the law of discrimination are 
designed to distinguish legitimate and/or nondiscriminatory outcomes from those that 
are illegitimate and/or discriminatory—an often difficult determination that is 
notoriously prone to error.89 However, this distinction—which is central to anti-
discrimination law—receives insufficient attention by scholars of unconscious bias 
who believe that discrimination is pervasive.90 The Kang and Banaji article is 
emblematic. The authors disparage the very notion of merits-based outcomes, implying 
that real-world determinations are rarely uncontaminated by sexual or racial identity. It 
thus follows that virtually all workplace practice is presumptively unlawful. They state: 
Although perceivers assume that their judgments are based “on the merits”—
in other words on the basis of qualities that the target in fact exhibits—the 
truth is more complicated. Even if we lack animus, intention to discriminate, 
or self-awareness of bias, our judgments of others may still lack “mental due 
process.” On subjective measures of merit, the perceiver’s (evaluator’s) 
expectations guide what she actually sees in the target . . . . In more plain 
language, if we expect someone to be violent, we will likely see violence 
when presented with ambiguous behavior.91 
 
88. See generally Robert Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in Employment Discrimination Law Revisited: A 
Brief Updated View of the Swamp, 51 MERCER L. REV. 651 (2000).  
89. See generally Richard Goldstein, Two Types of Statistical Errors in Employment Discrimination 
Cases, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 32 (1985). 
90. See, e.g., Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?: 
Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, 1100–01 (2009) (noting that, for unconscious bias 
theorists who believe “racial discrimination remains widespread,” the existence of “[racially] skewed 
outcomes alone become potentially persuasive evidence of discrimination”). 
91. Kang & Banaji, supra note 72, at 1085 (footnote omitted). 
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This passage is notable more for what it fails to say than for what it does. People 
think they are objective, but their judgments “may lack ‘mental due process.’” Their 
perceptions are “likely” to be skewed by expectations, rather than to reflect an 
objective reality. The authors stop short of asserting categorically that impartial 
assessments are impossible, and they never say outright that merits-based judgments do 
not exist. But the clear implication is that, in most contexts that matter, the notion of a 
“judgment on the merits” is a delusion and a snare, or at best an ideal state that is 
rarely, if ever, achieved. In short, although the authors never say “never,” they 
disparage the idea that merit routinely governs decisions in the real world. Beyond that 
their exposition is singularly unhelpful. They fail to provide (1) a quantitative 
assessment of the degree to which decisions are distorted; (2) a benchmark for 
ascertaining when bias is operating and when it is not; or (3) a protocol for applying 
these observations to the concrete task of deciding when laws against discrimination 
have been violated and who is entitled to relief. 
Kang and Banaji are not the only scholars to slight the quest for objective 
evidence of discrimination in favor of extravagant extrapolations from bias research. 
Another example is a recent article bemoaning the low success rate of anti-
discrimination lawsuits.92 It is well known that litigants alleging discrimination prevail 
at lower rates than plaintiffs in most other areas of civil litigation. Katie Eyer attributes 
this pattern to people’s unwillingness to believe that social actors have violated anti-
discrimination laws, which translates into fewer jury verdicts for plaintiffs.93 She bases 
this conclusion on research that allegedly shows a reluctance to “see” discrimination in 
a “wide array of factual circumstances—ranging from traditional disparate treatment to 
more complex forms of bias.”94 To support this assertion, Eyer relies on evidence she 
claims demonstrates that “most individuals think of discrimination as a phenomenon 
that is explicit, restricted in its manifestations, and generally unlikely to occur.”95 This 
means that “in all but the most compelling factual circumstances, most people believe 
that some measure of merit—such as effort or ability—is a more likely explanation for 
why minorities fail than the possibility of discrimination.”96 In short, Americans share 
a fundamental belief in meritocracy and think that its principles dominate key spheres 
of social and economic life. These “prevalent background beliefs,” she maintains, 
“account—at least in part—for the dismal odds that discrimination litigants face in 
litigating actual cases in the courts.”97 
Eyer’s article, however, contains almost no discussion of the precise legal 
standards that discrimination plaintiffs must meet or the types of evidence they must 
adduce to support allegations of unlawful disparate treatment. Moreover, the author’s 
argument is oblivious to the need for objective criteria by which the merits of 
 
92. Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-Discrimination 
Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=1780235. 
93. Id. (manuscript at 3–4). 
94. Id. (manuscript at 4). 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
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discrimination claims are to be assessed. These are serious shortcomings. It should be 
obvious that, without some independent measure of how much discrimination actually 
takes place, it is impossible to know whether plaintiffs in discrimination suits prevail 
too seldom or too often. In short, Eyer provides no method for ascertaining how often 
plaintiffs should prevail. According to Eyer, however, there is no need for an objective 
baseline or any empirical reality check. She just assumes there is more discrimination 
out there than juries are willing to find. 
Without objective validation, Eyer’s argument is fatally weak. Although 
plaintiffs’ success rate in discrimination claims is low relative to other types of suits, 
there is no a priori reason to think that outcomes will match across areas of litigation, 
and there may be good reasons why they do not. Why might large numbers of 
discrimination suits lack merit? Persons who are deprived of a desired and desirable 
condition of employment—such as a sought-after job or promotion—will often feel 
aggrieved. A person’s fate on the job affects his livelihood, future, identity and self-
worth. Attributing negative outcomes at work to discrimination rather than to one’s 
own shortcomings—or just to bad luck—spares the ego and softens the psychological 
blow of disappointment. Moreover, a high error rate in plaintiffs’ attributions of 
discrimination could well be due to the degree of information asymmetry that is 
endemic to the workplace. Employees are rarely in a position objectively to compare 
themselves to fellow workers or job candidates and are seldom privy to all the 
considerations behind staffing decisions. In sum, there are many reasons why 
employees might “see” discrimination when there is none. In the absence of systematic 
data, the existence and magnitude of these influences are, of course, necessarily 
speculative. But the notion that employees over-interpret the facts in their own favor is 
no less plausible than Eyer’s suggestion that jurors and judges refuse to acknowledge 
discrimination where it exists. In the end, Eyer’s assertion that the number of 
successful discrimination suits is “too low”—as opposed to “too high” or “about 
right”—evinces a belief that she shares with other scholars of implicit bias. If such bias 
is ubiquitous and the resulting discrimination pervasive, why bother to actually prove 
it? Why go through the arduous process of demonstrating that discrimination is the 
cause of any particular unfavorable decision? Why take on the burden of excluding 
rival explanations? For true believers in the pervasive influence of unconscious bias, 
there is no need to engage these onerous tasks. 
B. Remembering the Supply Side 
The cavalier attitude towards baselines and the obliviousness to objective criteria 
that are on display in the unconscious bias scholarship are disturbing. As noted, adverse 
outcomes for individuals or for groups in the employment context can have multiple 
possible explanations. The claim that stereotypical thinking routinely contaminates 
personnel decisions must be evaluated empirically. The key complication that bedevils 
this area is that of the “supply side”—the well-documented disparities between groups 
in American society in skills, human capital development, qualifications, and 
behavior.98 In the context of discrimination law and doctrine, such differences are 
 
98. See generally Wax, supra note 12. 
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routinely ignored or assumed away. Indeed, a pervasive assumption in discrimination 
law is that groups will be represented in most jobs in proportion to their share of the 
population.99 Absent illicit conduct, workplace demographics should reflect the 
background population, and any deviation is suspect. It follows that statistical 
imbalances must be due to discrimination, rather than some other factor. Likewise, 
unfavorable decisions for individual minorities are presumptively illegitimate. 
These understandings inform both disparate treatment and disparate impact 
doctrines in employment discrimination law. As I have argued elsewhere,100 they lie at 
the heart of the disparate impact theory under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. As first 
articulated in Griggs v. Duke Power,101 and carried forward in subsequent cases and 
EEOC regulations,102 the assumption of equal workplace representation finds 
expression in the so-called “4/5 rule.” This rule dictates that a business is 
presumptively liable for discrimination if the percentage of minority employees is less 
than 80% of candidates hired from the majority white population.103 Yet if the minority 
working-age population—or minority candidates for a particular job—are on average 
less skilled or qualified than other segments of the workforce, businesses that engage in 
competitive meritocratic staffing will routinely violate the 4/5 rule.104 Although 
employers can defend against liability by showing that their procedures are “job 
related,” meeting this standard is notoriously difficult, expensive, and fraught with 
uncertainty.  
Similar observations hold for disparate treatment allegations. At the point of 
hiring, the decision to offer a job to a non-minority candidate rather than, for example, 
a black candidate would only be suspect if the candidates were “similarly qualified.” 
However, the selection criteria that employers often use—including years of education, 
prior experience, and the results of screening procedures such as interviews—are 
imperfect proxies for ability and only partial predictors of future performance. Years of 
education completed, or the possession of a high school or college diploma, fail to 
distinguish between persons who have developed different degrees of proficiency or 
who have learned more or less in school. In fact, there is ample evidence that blacks on 
average know less and acquire fewer skills than whites with similar years of 
education.105 And there is also good evidence that academic achievement and tests of 
 
99. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977) (“[A]bsent explanation, 
it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or 
less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community from which 
employees are hired.”). 
100. See Amy L. Wax, Disparate Impact Realism, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2011). 
101. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
102. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2010). 
103. Wax, supra note 100, (manuscript at 2). 
104. Id. (manuscript at 4–5). 
105. See, e.g., Eric A. Hanushek, How Well Do We Understand Achievement Gaps?, FOCUS, Winter 
2010, at 5, 6–7 (citing data from national tests showing “stunning” gaps in academic performance between 
black and white high school students, with the average seventeen-year-old black student “achieving at the 
22nd percentile” for math and reading); Sharon Otterman, 37 Percent of New York Graduates Are College-
Ready, Data Show, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2011, at A23 (discussing New York State study on math and English 
scores which found that 51% of white students and 56% of Asian-American students were “college ready” 
after completing high school, versus only 13% of black students and 15% of Hispanic students); see also 
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cognitive skill are fairly good predictors of workplace productivity and success.106 
Given this data, the job performance of blacks and whites matched on years of 
education will tend to diverge, and thus the two groups will not—and should not—be 
hired at the same rates. Likewise, blacks and whites will on average fail to achieve the 
same average level of success on the job, which will likely affect pay and 
promotions.107 Of course, these general observations reveal nothing about individual 
cases or whether a particular employee has been treated justly or is the victim of 
discrimination. But they do justify wariness in inferring discrimination from disparate 
outcomes, and they should encourage scholars to take alternative explanations for 
existing patterns seriously. 
V. CURING UNCONSCIOUS BIAS: THE GAP BETWEEN PROPOSED REFORMS AND THE 
EVIDENCE THEY CAN REDUCE DISCRIMINATION 
As legal scholarship on unconscious bias has mushroomed, the question of how to 
address inadvertent bias has come to the fore. Like the scholarship touting the ubiquity 
of implicit stereotyping, the literature putting forth solutions108 has slighted the 
distinction between speculation and evidence. Once again, the obliviousness to 
baselines and the virtually complete absence of attention to supply-side factors is 
striking. Kang and Banaji, for example, propose a general set of recommendations for 
“proactive structural interventions,” on a “collective public health” model, that 
bypasses reliance “solely on potential individual litigation.”109 Drawing on the “social 
 
RICHARD ARUM & JOSIPA ROKSA, ACADEMICALLY ADRIFT: LIMITED LEARNING ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES 111–
112 (2011) (noting that black students on average learned less during college than whites even when entering 
academic credentials were controlled); THOMAS J. ESPENSHADE & ALEXANDRIA WALTON RADFORD, NO 
LONGER SEPARATE, NOT YET EQUAL: RACE AND CLASS IN ELITE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS AND CAMPUS LIFE 
226–29 (2009) (discussing research on group differences in scores and academic achievement); Richard C. 
Hunter & RoSusan Bartee, The Achievement Gap: Issues of Competition, Class, and Race, 35 EDUC. & URB. 
SOC'Y 151, 154–56 (2003) (same). 
106. See Frank L. Schmidt, The Role of General Cognitive Ability and Job Performance: Why There 
Cannot Be a Debate, 15 HUMAN PERFORMANCE 187, 187 (2002) (noting “overwhelming research evidence 
showing a strong link between general cognitive ability . . . and job performance”); see also Philip L. Roth & 
Philip Bobko, College Grade Point Average as a Potential Selection Device: Ethnic Group Differences and 
Potential Adverse Impact, J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 399, 399 (2000) (discussing correlation of grade-point average 
to job performance); Paul R. Sackett et al., High-Stakes Testing in Higher Education and Employment, 63 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 215, 216–19 (2008) (discussing predictive power of admission test results); Wax, supra note 
12, at 994 (citing Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in “General Ability” Job Testing, 104 HARV. L. 
REV. 1157 (1991)) (discussing pros and cons of general aptitude job testing as method for predicting job 
performance).  
107. See Paul R. Sackett & Steffanie L. Wilk, Within-Group Norming and Other Forms of Score 
Adjustments in Preemployment Testing, 49 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 929, 934 (1994) (discussing studies in 
organizational psychology reporting that blacks receive on-the-job performance ratings that average about .3-
.4 standard deviations below ratings for white workers). 
108. For examples of this literature, see Tristin K. Green, Race and Sex in Organizing Work: 
“Diversity,” Discrimination, and Integration, 59 EMORY L. REV. 585 (2010); Tristin K. Green & Alexandra 
Kalev, Discrimination-Reducing Measures at the Relational Level, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1435 (2008); Christine 
Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969 (2006); Kang & Banaji, supra note 
72. 
109. Kang & Banaji, supra note 72, at 1080. 
  
2011] ASSESSING THE ROLE OF UNCONSCIOUS BIAS 895 
 
contact hypothesis”—the theory that integration reduces stereotyping, decreases 
automatic biases, and promotes equality norms110—Kang and Banaji advocate the 
widespread adoption of affirmative action as a “tie breaker” and a mechanism for 
achieving more diversity and social mixing.111 
These recommendations have serious drawbacks. First, it is far from clear whether 
affirmative action will have much effect on the incidence of unconscious bias at all, let 
alone whether it will reduce harms from discrimination, as the authors predict. The 
authors offer no studies that actually document such outcomes. Nor do they show that 
the people who will benefit from affirmative action are those who would otherwise fall 
victim to unconscious ill treatment. Likewise, they fail to demonstrate that affirmative 
action would rectify any discrimination to the appropriate degree, as opposed to 
conferring advantages that are remedially unjustified. In short, the authors assume 
everything and demonstrate nothing. Second, the evidence indicates that using 
affirmative action as a tie-breaker will not measurably alter the demographic 
composition of the workplace, academic institutions, or other competitive social 
contexts. As noted, academic and workplace imbalances are largely traceable to 
persistent and significant disparities by race in skill and developed human capital.112 
The problem is that there are relatively fewer qualified blacks in the population than 
persons from other demographic groups. Blacks are thus seldom “tied” with white or 
Asian candidates for competitive positions. 
One well-documented example is law school admissions. Blacks significantly 
underperform whites on the Law School Admission Test (LSAT), which is an 
important criterion for admission to law schools nationwide. And very few blacks 
achieve scores (about 165 and above) that would earn admission at elite institutions.113 
Another example is recruitment into the military. The U.S. government has long used 
entrance exams that measure or draw on cognitive ability to determine admission to the 
armed forces and assignments to desirable positions within it. These screens have a 
pronounced disparate impact by race. According to a recent report, while 16% of 
otherwise qualified whites applying to enter the military (i.e., men and women with a 
high school degree and no serious criminal record) failed to achieve the required 
minimum score on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT), 39% of black applicants 
scored below the cutoff.114 Among candidates admitted, over 43% of white inductees, 
but fewer than 18% of black inductees, scored high enough (in the top two categories) 
to qualify for special technical training and placement in elite service jobs. 115 It should 
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be obvious that using affirmative action as a “tie breaker” will do little to alter these 
stark disparities. This observation is important, because service in the military 
functions as a training ground and stepping-stone into the workforce for many people 
without a college degree. Yet blacks are disproportionately excluded because they have 
not achieved the minimum competence necessary to function in the military setting. In 
sum, lack of preparation, rather than the failure to prefer equally qualified blacks, is 
responsible for most of the underrepresentation of blacks in desirable positions in 
government, business, and the professions. “Tie breaking” affirmative action will do 
little to change this. Much more drastic affirmative action would be needed to achieve a 
measurable effect. Indeed, the most important implication of the underlying data is that 
unconscious biases—and discrimination generally—are not the primary reason for 
blacks’ poor outcomes or relative lack of success. Rather, large and well-documented 
skill differences more than account for observed patterns of group representation in the 
workplace and society generally. Without better quantitative evidence on the role of 
implicit biases relative to other measurable “supply side” factors, there is no reason to 
believe that banishing or alleviating unconscious bias will have much effect on racial 
gaps in the real world overall. 
Finally, although Kang and Banaji (as well as other scholars) rely heavily on the 
“social contact” hypothesis in formulating approaches to unconscious bias,116 the 
evidence on the benefits of interracial mixing is decidedly mixed. Even Kang and 
Banaji admit that strategies to increase diversity and promote group interaction are 
unpredictable and potentially counterproductive. They note the possibility that 
affirmative action may “strengthen[] identification with and resentment across 
race[s].”117 They cite evidence that “intergroup contact may not counteract negative 
stereotypes,” but might in some cases promote them.118 Given the unsettled nature of 
the research, and the paucity of data on how interracial mixing operates in particular 
settings, an aggressive stance towards mandated integration as a cure for unconscious 
bias is decidedly premature. 
Two other recent articles also exemplify the trend towards sweeping 
recommendations based on insufficient evidence. As with others who have written in 
this area, Tristin Green and Alexandra Kalev bemoan the limitations of anti-
discrimination law and the restricted potential of conventional litigation to address the 
types of unconscious bias and stereotyping that are claimed to infect the contemporary 
workplace.119 According to Green and Kalev, employers should be encouraged or 
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required to take informal steps designed to reduce unconscious discrimination at the 
relational level. Legislatures should even consider imposing liability for “failing to 
address relational sources of discrimination.”120 The “debiasing” measures they 
recommend include affirmative action to create a critical mass of “role models” and 
“countertypical exemplars,” diversity training, formalization and transparency in 
decisionmaking, an increase in cooperative teamwork, and a reduction in hierarchy and 
status differentials on the job.121 These recommendations are too sprawling to analyze 
in detail here, but suffice it to say that they suffer from breathtaking scope and 
maddening vagueness. They also rest on say-so. The authors advance little or no 
evidence that the recommended measures will achieve their stated purpose and provide 
no criteria for assessing whether or not they do. 
Katharine Bartlett’s recent foray into the “debiasing” project is more forthright in 
acknowledging the limitations of the data.122 She concedes that the systematic 
structural reforms proposed as an antidote to implicit bias have never actually been 
proven effective.123 She also accepts and defends the fundamental paradigm of 
disparate treatment law, which demands that discrimination be demonstrated through a 
causal relationship between impermissible factors and adverse outcomes.124 Along 
those lines, Bartlett, criticizes many proposals for “short-circuit[ing] basic issues of 
proof and causation and second-guess[ing] a wide range of employer decisions.”125 
Accordingly, she faults proposed reforms that impose employer liability “based on 
potential rather than actual discrimination”; that “abandon the necessity for establishing 
a causal link between an employment decision and a victim’s race, sex or other 
protected characteristic”;126 and that are “designed to hold employers liable for 
workplace procedures and structures that could give rein to unconscious bias, even if 
not shown to do so.”127 In short, she deplores the suggestion that discrimination should 
be found by “a rule that presumes it.”128 
Bartlett also asserts that some of the “structural” reforms that have been proposed 
by scholars of unconscious bias can potentially have a “negative effect[] . . . on the 
very discrimination they seek to reduce.”129 Specifically, interference with a range of 
management prerogatives can engender resentment and a sense of unfairness within the 
workplace, thus “undermining the conditions necessary to motivate people to want to 
avoid implicit discrimination.”130 She singles out diversity training and diversity 
evaluations as ineffective and as patronizing workers by implying they “need to be 
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taught not to discriminate because right now they do not know any better.”131 She is 
critical of affirmative action because “measures that appear to favor members of 
protected groups at the expense of identifiable, seemingly deserving majority workers . 
. . tend to provoke resistance.”132 
Despite these criticisms, Bartlett looks upon some “workplace culture” changes 
with favor. She claims that workplace collaboration, the reduction of “status 
differentials,” and “job rotation programs” can reduce stereotyping and improve 
prospects for women and racial minorities in the workplace.133 That is because they 
“focus on promoting people’s good intentions,” and on enhancing “contact and 
cooperative attitudes” among people from different groups.134 
It is hard to know how to evaluate Bartlett’s selective rejection and embrace of 
different “debiasing” proposals. Despite her relative circumspection, she endorses 
reforms (team building and collaborative cooperation) for which the evidence is as thin 
or equivocal as for the reforms she denigrates. The research she cites provides no 
objective measure of actual discrimination or bias, nor do the studies she relies upon 
show its abatement—they simply claim to register more positive attitudes or document 
more favorable actions towards minorities without demonstrating that these are 
objectively justified by neutral, valid, non-race-based criteria.135 At bottom, the 
efficacy of Bartlett’s proposed measures (and others) remains a matter of speculation. 
Specifically, whether particular interventions will actually produce less unlawful 
discrimination—that is, fewer instances of injurious behavior “because of” race or sex 
in any given context—remains to be seen. It is ironic that Bartlett, who criticizes some 
proposals for dispensing with proof of actual discriminatory causation, fails to 
discharge that burden herself. To be sure, her recommendations are informal: she does 
not propose requiring structural reform as a matter of law. But she nonetheless asks us 
to believe that the changes she advocates will have the predicted effects. Bartlett cannot 
escape the fact that there is no reliable gauge of stereotyping and bias in the workplace, 
and no objective baseline for determining when those influences are operating. 
Creating more diversity and putting more minorities in positions of power—although 
perhaps desirable in itself—does not establish that discrimination and bias have abated 
or disappeared. Likewise, less diversity does not mean that bias is operating. 
VI. UNCONSCIOUS BIAS: WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
A more productive approach might be to step far back from the debate and think 
about ultimate objectives. What are the goals of anti-discrimination law and workplace 
reform more generally? In this regard, race and gender present somewhat different 
issues, if only because the potential causes—and cures—for observed race and gender 
disparities are different. 
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In the case of race, inequalities are widespread across multiple domains. Ralph 
Banks and Richard Ford have recently confronted this fact in the context of reviewing 
the large body of work on unconscious bias.136 Their discussion comes close to 
achieving the tentative and measured response that the current state of the art warrants. 
First, the authors make some insightful points about the “ascendance of unconscious 
bias” as a dominant theme in race-discrimination scholarship.137 They speculate that 
the growing focus on inadvertent rather than deliberate bias can be ascribed to the 
political appeal of identifying unconscious processes as the dominant source of racial 
prejudice and discrimination in society today.138 People are unaware of their 
inadvertent stereotypes and have little control over them, so they appear less 
blameworthy for possessing and acting on them. As Banks and Ford explain, 
“[b]ecause the unconscious bias discourse does not imply that one is a liar or a racist, 
there is less reason to resist the claim that implicit bias thrives somewhere within one’s 
self.”139 Thus “people may be willing to acknowledge the possibility of unconscious 
bias within themselves even as they would vigorously deny harboring conscious 
bias.”140 
On the other hand, Banks and Ford note that there are costs to assigning a central 
role to unconscious, as opposed to animus-driven, racism. The lesser blameworthiness 
of unconscious motives can diminish people’s sense of responsibility and thereby 
undermine the imperative to address and rectify racism.141 The authors also fear that 
focusing on unconscious bias will intensify efforts to exert intrusive and undesirable 
forms of social control. They identify as major risks of “unconscious bias discourse” a 
trend towards “technocratic authoritarianism” and the increased use of heavy-handed 
efforts to “enforce a norm of technically rational decision making.”142 The authors 
further observe that “unconscious bias theory makes racism seem more a medical 
problem than a social one.”143 This invites systemic and coercive interventions 
analogous to public health measures, which can seriously compromise personal 
freedom and social flexibility. 
Finally, Banks and Ford are wary of the discrepancy between claims of 
unconscious bias and the evidence of resulting discrimination. In line with the concerns 
expressed above, the authors identify “the pivotal empirical question” as “whether 
[unconscious reactions] prompt discriminatory behavior.”144 In particular, they ask 
whether the IAT is a good predictor or measure of propensity to discriminate.145 These 
authors candidly admit that, at the present juncture, the answer to this question must be 
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a resounding no.146 They assert that the “ambiguities and uncertainties” in the science 
make IAT evidence, which consists mainly of laboratory observations, a poor guide to 
behavior in the real world.147 They also note that this weakness has been “glossed over 
in most popular accounts of the IAT.”148 The authors conclude that, although the IAT 
“may eventually prove a useful predictor of discriminatory behavior, [it] cannot now be 
comfortably described as such.”149 It follows that tests designed to gauge unconscious 
bias cannot accurately identify perpetrators of discrimination. Nor can they tell us 
whose decisions are and will be tainted by impermissible considerations of race. 
Indeed, there is no indication that laboratory measures of inadvertent bias provide any 
information that might be useful or dispositive in legal claims of discrimination. 
In the end, Banks and Ford argue that the obsession with inadvertent stereotyping 
is a distraction from the real causes—and cures—for racial inequality. Although not 
denying “the existence of unconscious bias,” the authors “do doubt that racial bias 
explains all or even most of the racial injustices that plague our society.”150 In their 
view, “racial injustice . . . is a matter of pervasive substantive inequalities, the 
amelioration of which should be the goal of reform efforts.”151 For them, the needed 
improvements are unlikely to come from searching for instances of unconscious bias or 
from working to establish its influence. The authors recognize that “the embrace of the 
unconscious bias idea” might be viewed by some scholars as a way to generate 
“support for policies that would further the goal of substantive equality.”152 But they do 
not believe this strategy will ultimately prove effective, and they are sensitive to its 
considerable costs. They instead recommend that the goals of “integration, reparations, 
or equal outcomes” be pursued directly.153 
The Banks and Ford article is useful in reviewing the shortcomings of 
unconscious bias research, in explaining why skepticism towards claims about 
unconscious discrimination is justified, and in expressing appropriate concern that the 
obsession with unconscious bias is misplaced. Beyond that, however, the authors are 
vague on the particular inequalities they want addressed and the measures that should 
be taken to correct them. Without a close analysis of those inequalities (economic, 
personal, familial, educational, occupational, etc.) and the strategies proposed to tackle 
them, the authors' recommendations cannot adequately be assessed. Some general 
observations are in order, however. Banks and Ford repeatedly use the word “injustice” 
to describe the inequalities and adverse social conditions that plague minorities. But 
they fail to grapple with the possibility that not all group inequalities are necessarily 
“unjust.” In other words, not all disparities—including, possibly, those that emerge 
between different groups—can be ascribed to unfair social conditions, as opposed to 
differences in effort, restraint, preferences, performance, or bad luck. Accordingly, not 
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all will warrant correction on grounds of justice. In addition, in issuing an urgent call 
for a social response to racial inequalities, Banks and Ford fail to acknowledge the 
possibility that government action and social programs may prove ineffective against 
many observed group differentials, or may even do more harm than good.154 Finally, 
their exhortation to drastic action raises the very concerns—of overbearing government 
and pervasive social control—that they deplore in responses to unconscious bias. 
VII. PERSISTENT INEQUALITIES: REMEMBER THE SUPPLY SIDE 
Banks’ and Ford’s concern with eradicating racial inequalities brings us back full 
circle to the problem of the supply side. What are the causes of group differences in 
outcomes, and how can they be effectively addressed? Legal scholarship looks first to 
discrimination, but a clear-eyed view of the entire picture reveals that disparities by 
race and class have more complex roots. This Article has focused primarily on racial 
inequality, where the supply side looms large. The relative underdevelopment of 
human capital in the black community, for instance, could help explain persistent 
inequalities in the workplace, and might account for a large portion of existing gaps.155 
Ford and Banks do not deny this. Rather, they appear to see it as a problem to be 
solved, but say very little about how to do that. Their acknowledgment of the influence 
of the supply side, however indirect, returns us to the pivotal issue in anti-
discrimination law—which is causation. The numbers are out of whack, and the 
outcomes are disparate. There may be discrimination, but there may also be other 
factors at work. The relative importance of each is critical, and sorting this out is a 
matter of determining causation. The challenge is daunting, but the problem cannot be 
avoided or waved away. Without establishing that race (or sex, or some other forbidden 
factor) has entered into a decision, there can be no credible accusation of 
discrimination. 
In resolving the allegations in a case like Wal-Mart, a court would have to decide 
whether a particular worker was the victim of discrimination or whether she was 
terminated, denied a raise, or passed over for a promotion for some other reason. 
“Structural problems” may indeed plague the Wal-Mart workplace. Perhaps, as alleged, 
the company's procedures render some personnel decisions vulnerable to bias. But that 
observation tells us nothing about how many—and which—of the myriad women who 
have worked for Wal-Mart have been unlawfully discriminated against, and how many 
have not. 
The answers to these questions are likely to prove elusive, because excluding 
alternative explanations for adverse outcomes in the workplace or other social spheres 
is always difficult and sometimes impossible. At this juncture, the limitations of anti-
discrimination law are manifest. Indeed, many commentators have noted the narrow 
scope and methodological strictures inherent in the legal doctrine.156 Perhaps the 
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requirements are too stringent and should be relaxed. But it is very hard to translate that 
recommendation into specific, well-defined reforms that serve their stated purpose—
which is to distinguish legitimate decisions from illegitimate ones. It is one thing to 
find fault with the current system, but quite another to devise an alternative that is fair 
to all concerned. Far-reaching transformations of the workplace—including the 
wholesale reorganization of work and sweeping shifts in how employees interact and 
are evaluated—are now the recommendations of choice.157 Whether such untested and 
potentially costly measures will be implemented or will prove worthwhile is as yet 
unknown. But if Ford and Banks (and this author) are correct—that is, if unconscious 
bias and discrimination are relatively minor sources of group inequality today—the 
enduring solutions will surely lie elsewhere. 
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